Introduction 2
There is little doubt that the thought of Peter Singer has had a profound effect on both the status of moral thinking and its relation to issues in applied ethics, but the aim of this paper is to depart from considerations in the realm of practical thought in order to investigate a deeper theoretical tension which underpins the whole edifice. The argument shall concentrate on the convergence of his prescriptivist meta-ethics and his redefinition of equality as equal consideration of interests. On the one hand, Singer holds the meta-ethical position of prescriptivism: equality does not correspond to a state of affairs, it is an ideal which determines moral experience; whereas, on the other, he argues that equality has to be extended and granted to all those beings which have interests.
This second assumption appears to ground equality in a state of affairs or empirical facts about the world which Singer's meta-ethical assertion denies.
Supposedly, this is based in the procedural requirement of impartiality which Singer, like Hare before him, argues leads to a substantial utilitarian position. 3 This article aims to demonstrate that there exists a recognition in Singer's thought of a second source of substantial obligations, that is the moral fabric of a particular society, and that his full ethical position draws upon a position similar to Hegelian absolute idealism. The main claims that will be made are that the procedural constraint of impartiality does not necessarily lead to, or even favours, a utilitarian ethics and that Singer is implicitly aware that social conditions determine the nature of our moral obligations, especially the substantial content 
Singer's prescriptivism
The concern of much of Singer's thinking, and the guiding theme of Practical Ethics, is equality. Central to moral and political thought of the late twentieth century is the presupposition that all humans are equal and the principle itself has taken on the aspect of self-certainty; it has become a bedrock of moral thinking. Yet, it is not self-evident and it needs to be extrapolated in fuller terms. One possible answer is that pluralities of individuals can only be used to infer facts about pluralities of individuals and not about particular individuals. So, although men are on average physically stronger than women, one is unable to say on the basis of this statistical fact that this particular man is stronger than that particular woman. And so any characteristic supposedly inferred from a group (such as a person's race, gender or religion) cannot supply any morally relevant information about a particular person. Therefore, in saying that all humans are equal, we grant them the same rights irrespective of their cultural and genetic origins. It would be unjust for an individual's opportunities to be either increased or limited simply due to a statistical fact about the race, gender or creed to which he or she belongs.
However, even though such a principle will seemingly rule out unequal and unfair treatment across the races and genders, it will not be able to criticise a society in which the populace is divided into those with an IQ above 100 and those with an IQ below 100, with greater rights and better opportunities being granted to those in the first class. Here, we are not inferring a fact about an individual from a plurality of individuals, but treating each person as an individual. The problem is that this defence of the principle of equality is still tied to the assumption that equality is based, in some sense, on a state of affairs which holds with regard to 5
Between the Species, VIII, August 2008, cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ individuals. Here it is obvious that intelligence is being used as that feature of the world which is morally relevant. Hence humans are more valuable than animals because they are more intelligent. However, if this is the basis of the principle of equality, then our fictional society above is consistent with it. If we lower the threshold of intelligence, not only are we being arbitrary, but the lowest common denominator which would include children, the least intellectually endowed adults, the intellectually disadvantaged and so on, will not be able to rule out the inclusion of, at least, the higher animals. Such a conclusion would be repeated if we were to replace intelligence with language-possession, consciousness, moral personality, et cetera. What motivates us to extend the principle to all humans and to simultaneously exclude all animals? So when we say that animals are inferior to us, we cannot say because they lack a certain relevant characteristic (language possession, reason, et cetera) or do not have a relevant characteristic to the required degree (intelligence) because this can never rule out a political community which embodies this fact into a social hierarchy and involves a high redefinition of the term human in 'all humans are equal.'
Singer's point here is simple: if the principle of equality is tied to some supposed actual equality amongst humans, that is some state of affairs which obtains in the world, then this does not rule out certain unequal societies, nor does it exclude some species of animals from equal consideration. These arguments have been hurriedly presented mainly because they are rather straightforward and thoroughly covered by Singer himself. 5 Given the first of these problems,
6
Between the Species, VIII, August 2008, cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ Singer is not content to champion the rights of animals on such a basis; viz., the idea that 'human' cannot be defined in empirical terms when used in moral prescriptions that will not exclude the higher animals. Instead he believes the principle of equality cannot and should not be based on a judgement which supposedly corresponds to a state of affairs, if it were then the principle all humans are equal could become self-contradictory without a high redefinition of what a human is. Such a redefinition would be arbitrary, all true humans are x (where x can be replaced with: have an IQ over 100, and so on) is as arbitrary as, say, x is male, or x is of a certain race.
If equality is not tied to a state of affairs, then when one states the principle 'All humans are equal' what is one actually asserting according to Singer? The answer to this question is to be found in his meta-ethical position. He defines agents who live by ethical standards as those who 'believe, for any reason, that it is right to do as they are doing… The notion of living according to ethical standards is tied up with the notion of defending the way one is living, of giving a reason for it, of justifying it.' 6 The commitment to, at least, a minimal ethical code reveals that Singer wishes to hold on to the rational nature of moral discourse: moral judgements can be defended, debated and rejected and also be logically connected because they are ruled by reason-giving. More importantly, such reasons have to justify my action in such a way that you too recognise the motivating power of such a reason. Self-regarding motives can explain an act but cannot justify an act ethically: an ethical reason is one which is as acceptable to 7
Between the Species, VIII, August 2008, cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ you as it is to me. Therefore, for a reason to be ethical it cannot refer to the particularity of the agent or the situation, ethical reasons are reasons for whomever, wherever and whenever; they must -to put it simply -be universal.
Implicit to Singer's position is the requirement of impartiality: a reason to be a moral reason must be impartial in the sense of not treating one person or group (including oneself) differently from another unless there is a morally good reason to do so. This requirement is derived from the demand of universality. In order to be certain that one's reason is impartial, one ought to imaginatively take the position of all those who would be affected by one's action and ask whether one would accept the justification. This is what rules out egoism at the outset and also grounds equality in impartiality: when one asks whether this reason is as acceptable to an other as it is to oneself, one imagines oneself in a dialogue with a moral partner and a partner who demands one's respect.
Hence, Singer's own meta-ethical position clearly echoes Hare's principal task of reconciling the antinomy between the freedom to form one's own moral opinions and the aspiration that moral discourse be rational in nature. 7 And their solution is also the same: equality is not a descriptive statement that corresponds to some reality but a prescriptive one. Prescriptivism is expressed in the assertion of three features of moral discourse: moral judgements are prescrip moral judgements differ from other prescriptive statements through To make sense of equality, one has to give up the belief that in stating that all humans as equal one is representing some fact about the world. Singer sees this as crucial in order to avoid, on the one hand, a high redefinition of the meaning of human in order to exclude non-human animals, and, on the other, social orders which are consistent with the fact of equality but contradict our intuition of what equality should be:
We can reject this 'hierarchy of intelligence' and similar fantastic schemes only if we are clear that the claim to equality does not rest on the possession of intelligence, moral personality, rationality, or similar matters of fact. There is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we give to their interests. Equality is a basic ethical principle, not an assertion of fact. 8 So, equality for Singer is a 'basic ethical principle' which he will also describe as:
'Equality is a moral ideal, not a simple assertion of fact… The principle of equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat humans.' 9 Equality is a prescription, in stating the principle 'all humans are equal' one does not describe a state of affairs but prescribes the way in which one's behaviour towards other humans has to be regulated. Equality is an axiomatic principle which makes 9
Between the Species, VIII, August 2008, cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ policies such as freedom of opportunity rational. As an axiomatic principle, it structures the way in which one makes moral judgements and it can be quite accurately characterised as a category of moral knowledge which makes moral judgements possible. In this way, no matter the actual differences between individuals, races, creeds and genders, the principle dictates equal treatment.
Singer's equation of equality with equal considerations of interests
So the statement 'all humans are equal' is not a description of a morally relevant fact somehow discoverable in the world, it is a prescription which determines and regulates the behaviour of agents. It is a cornerstone of moral thinking: there would be some comprehensible logical progression from this principle to substantial rights of individuals, such as employment laws. However, there is an obvious problem for any prescriptivist: if 'all humans are equal' is not tied in some way to a characteristic or ability, and it is a moral principle which is imposed upon the world by the thinking mind in order to have moral experience, then how can we decide between 'all humans are equal' and 'all white, males are equal' since the assertion is in no way ruled by input from the world? With a principle of equality tied to some feature of the world, one can see the injustice in excluding women from certain rights and opportunities because they lack reasoning skills, higher thought powers, the proper faculty of judgement, or are too stupid. It is unjust because it is flatly false. Ditto applied to any specific race. However, this simplicity is not available to a prescriptivist because prescriptions are not tied to facts about the world. Why is it that my experience ruled by 'all white males are equal' is inconsistent or not logical in a way that any moral experience ruled by the principle 'all humans are equal' is not? The prescriptivist is able to show how moral statements are logically consistent with one another, but unlike a moral realist, there is no way to justify those bedrock axioms such as equality, liberty, et cetera. These are to be taken as self-evident, but why is it that 'all humans are equal' is granted this status whereas 'all white, males are equal' is not?
According to Singer, these axiomatic statements must be rationally justifiable, that is they must be capable of being either defended or rejected. His method involves a two-step process whereby the statement 'all humans are equal' is dependent on a rational reconstruction of its substantial content, and those moral intuitions which confirm or obstruct this reconstruction are refined using, for want of a better term, deconstruction. In other words, he attempts to derive rational constraints for the principle of equality from the requirement of impartiality, and then he wants to show that the counter-intuitive nature of the consequences of this reconstruction are due to irrational and arbitrary features of one's set of socially formed moral judgements and not due to the redefinition of the principle itself.
The rational reconstruction of the definition of x in the axiom 'all x are equal' begins from the rationally defensible considered moral judgement that all humans are equal and the requirements of impartiality. The first step involves
11
Between the Species, VIII, August 2008, cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ imagining oneself as a member of a disadvantaged group and to see whether, as a member of that group, one will accept the reason given as justifying the action which affects one. Imagination requires recognition of the individual or group as a possible moral partner whether in actual discourse or by proxy. This way the universal nature of equality is respected and extended to children, the mentally disadvantaged, the mute, small countries in unfair bargaining positions in the global political sphere, et cetera. The only inclusive principle of equality is equal consideration of interests, but this does not, of course, rule out non-human beings with interests. For an action to be morally justifiable, then all those interests which are affected by it must be considered. Singer's point is simple: as a member of the group of males, I accept that the right of abortion need not be extended to me as such an extension has no effect on my interests, but as a woman I may feel that the right to vote is a right which equality demands on my behalf due to the satisfaction or frustration of my interests. As a member of another species, it is difficult to imagine that I would be prepared to suffer and die just so that a human mouth may have the pleasure of tasting my flesh. This is nothing but the demand that reasons, if they are to be regarded as ethical, must be universalisable, which is to say that they must be acceptable to whomever they will affect. Singer believes that the universal aspect of ethics provides a persuasive reason for a minimal utilitarianism: 'In accepting that ethical judgments must be made from a universal point of view, I am accepting that my own interests cannot, simply because they are my interests, count more than the interests of anyone else. Thus my very natural concern that my own
12
Between the Species, VIII, August 2008, cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ interests be looked after must, when I think ethically, be extended to the interests of others.' 10 So, the rational reconstruction of the principle of equality given the requirements of impartiality leads to its redefinition as a principle of equal consideration of interests.
However, such a new principle seems counter-intuitive in that it jars against some of the central moral givens of our ethical tradition; most obviously, it levels off the claims made on one by humans and non-human animals. This is where Singer seeks to revise these moral judgements through the process of the deconstruction of our traditional distinction between species. He never tires of mentioning that the main reason one is loathe to extend the principle of equality to members of other species in the same way that is has been extended, through history and progress, to women and members of other races, is based on a putative assumption.
Given the stark presentation of the application of the principle of equality, why is it that thinkers are reluctant to extend it to members of other species? The reason, according to Singer, is that there exists a putative prejudice embodied in the ontological distinction between humans and animals. The word 'animal' carries linguistic baggage: it divides things off and places a privilege on humans.
Language, in dividing the world into humans and animals, creates an ontological duality in which one is at home when one thinks that there is an insurmountable difference between the two things and it makes one think that the there is also a
13
Between the Species, VIII, August 2008, cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ difference in value. It is for this reason that Singer's method has been termed a form of deconstruction. Deconstruction identifies a conventional linguistic duality: human/animal; duty/charity; and speech/writing and seeks to demonstrate that philosophy is often guilty of privileging one of the terms over the other and arbitrarily assigning a value to it. Yet, interrogation would reveal that such a privilege is nothing but a linguistic echo that has been rhetorically and not rationally transformed, due to metaphysical error, into an ontological and evaluative distinction. No good reason can be offered for the privileging of one term over the other, instead the value distinction relies on a convention embodied in language that seems intuitive to the agent who utters the statement. The arbitrariness is often disclosed in the contradictory nature of these terms, such as "human" which means both "not animal", "better than animal" yet also a particular species of animal. 11 Humans are animals, the word means animals of the species Homo sapiens, but language -rhetoric -is doing the arguing rather than any reason. One assumes a human has more value than an animal because of a linguistic echo. The fact that the decision to choose one dominate meaning over another is not made on rational grounds, but that it is done on the basis of presupposition and prejudice, makes the decision arbitrary; even if one can genealogically explain how it came about, one cannot morally justify it. There exists a reason, but it is found to be not a good reason when interrogated.
The deconstructive method coupled with the reconstructive requirement of impartiality proceeds by demanding that the disclosure of this arbitrary linguistic In the past, one would have offered men, or white men, but such a choice is revealed by internal (civil rights and feminist movements) and external (the moral status of members of other races and countries) inconsistencies to be rationally unsupportable and merely an institutional prejudice. Hence, the most widely accepted form of the principle is all humans are equal, but it has been shown that even if there are differences between humans, it should not affect our principle of equality. Once one realises that there are differences between animals, but no essential ontological difference between humans and non-human animals, one needs to show where the principle of equality no longer applies. The arbitrary border between human animals and non-human animals -like that which existed in the past between the genders and races -is shown to have no justification except an institutional, traditional or, to put it another way, customary one. The demand is for a rational rather than a mere explanatory justification.
One cannot deny that there are important difference between humans and members of other species, but we need to ask whether such differences lead to different moral consideration. The differences may give rise to different rights, but this does not rule out equal consideration. Singer's aim is to redraw the boundaries of equality along a more rational line. His basic assumption, then, is that the only principle of equality which embraces all human beings with all their differences is the principle of equal consideration of interests. Thus, the division of the world into those things with which we are concerned with and those things which do not concern us -that is, the definition of the set of actual or proxy moral partners -cannot be rationally drawn along the line of species since this would be to embody a linguistic prejudice. For Singer, equality depends on interests: the world has to be divided into things with interests and things which have no interests and a moral agent has to be concerned with the former. Those things which have interests are those things which can suffer. However, this cannot be rationally limited to humans alone, it must be extended to include members of other species, most notably non-human animals.
Yet, it is here that a contradiction becomes apparent. The demand for equality is a prescription for Singer, it does not represent a state of affairs. However, if this is the case how is it that 'all humans are equal' is a better prescription than 'all white, males are equal'? Singer's answer is that the only relevant characteristic is not colour, gender, intelligence, or moral personality but whether a being has interests or not. Women and non-white humans have interests so they must be treated equally. As do animals. So the most rational principle, for Singer, is 'all beings with interests are equal'. This begins to sound as though Singer is now offering some feature of the world which justifies the distinction between things we are concerned about and things we are not which is hard to balance with the assertion that equality is a prescription not a description. It is not clear how descriptive statements make a difference to prescriptive ones and, for this reason, 
Squaring the circle: Hegelianism
The philosophical position of prescriptivism is purely formal and there is no formal reason why "all humans are equal" is a more rational prescription than "all white males are equal" without substantial constraints that determine its content. Singer attempts to derive substantial constraints on the content of prescriptions through the requirement of impartiality, which, for him, favours a minimal utilitarian stance, if not -as he admits -necessarily entailing it. 12 However, the requirement of impartiality does not led to utilitarianism but merely to the recognition that all interests affected by the action count equally. This is the traditional Benthamite ad hoc addition to utilitarian theory and not a consequence of adopting it. In asking who is to count as a moral partner and what one is to count as interests remains formal until utilitarianism is fed into the equation. In other words, for Singer, impartiality and its interpretation as equality is prior to utilitarianism. To fully understand the move from formal prescriptions to substantial obligations, it is necessary to defend a rather startling claim: Singer can be characterised in two important aspects as a Hegelian.
There are several points to be made in support of such a peculiar claim. First, Hegel himself characterises fully rational moral (and political) judgements in the (1) The first element which reflects a latent Hegelianism in Singer's meta-ethical position is the embodiment of progress in the moral sciences. Singer holds that having shown that there can be no rational justification for the continued existence of the meat industry, he assumes that the only thing which supports it is the conservatism of custom. In one quotation we are offered an interesting parallel between our own customs and the customs of the past:
The decision to cease giving it that support may be difficult, but it is no more difficult than it would have been for a white Southerner to go against the traditions of his society and free his slaves, if we do not
18
Between the Species, VIII, August 2008, cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ change our dietary habits, how can we censure those slave-holders who would not change their own way of living? 15 Coupled with this he offers us the assertion that 'Eskimos living in an environment where they must kill animals for food or starve might be justified in claiming that their interest in surviving overrides that of the animals they kill.' 16 For Hegel, moral categories and concepts, axiomatic prescriptions such as equality and freedom, are necessary in order for the subject to have moral experience. However, as abstract concepts they are too formal to dictate substantial obligations and these can only arise from the content of a specific way of life. The formal requirement of universality can exclude only systems of thought that explicitly reject the central value of equality and those which are egoist in nature but it cannot determine the substantial content of obligations. This is possible only if a description of what is good (interests, welfare, respect) is offered. So, one can formally state equality for all, but substantially one must say what equality entails (opportunity, respect, resources, etc.) and to whom it is to be extended (members of my nation, human beings, rational agents). Hegel's point is that this will be supplied by or be a product of my social context or moral fabric and not the workings of practical or pure reason. 17 Yet, this is not relativism since these ways of life which supply one's moral obligations may become inconsistent when new moral problems cannot be adequately articulated or comprehended by the existing moral structures of experience, as happened with Antigone who had to navigate the conflicting what is rational has to be actual. 20 A moral principle is not a simple assertion, but a prescription -it determines the way in which the knowing subject structures experience. For Hegel, this is a reciprocal process: our categories of understanding must be adequate for us to labour in the world, and reciprocally the world has to live up to our categoriesespecially the moral ones. His idealism is described as absolute because one day the subject's categories of knowing will adequately fit the world and the world will have been made rational, by labour, in order to correspond to such categories.
This, in brief, is the end of history thesis. Human action, through the creation and refinement of social institutions and practices, moulds the world to fit the requirements of moral demands and values (a constitutional commitment to equality), whereas the interests of groups and individuals mould the rationality of these institutions to fit the demands of the world (the demands by civil rights Singer's meta-ethical position can, therefore, be characterised as a prescriptivist, but one who takes seriously the absolute idealist's postulation of a relationship between the rational structures of moral experience and the institutions and practices of the social world which embody and give content to these rational structures. For Singer, the crucial relationship is between the prescription of equality and the rational basis of this in the fact that it has to be based on the minimal condition that things are granted equality when we are concerned with them. Those things with which we can be rationally concerned are those that actually have interests and suffer when those interests are thwarted. Equal consideration of interests is consistent with prescriptivism only on the basis of a minimal Hegelianism which allows for a relationship between rationality and actuality.
The rationality of axiomatic prescriptions
Singer has to demonstrate that there is a choice between the principle of equality which extends across all species and the principle of equality applied only to humans and that to choose the latter is arbitrary and, although it can be The difference between arbitrariness and rationality is, for Singer, to be marked by impartiality: if equality is a moral ideal, a way in which we structure the world as moral beings, then it is irrational when it privileges the interests of a specific group for no good moral reason. Our concern for others, according to Singer, does not depend upon what they are like or what abilities they possess, even if that is moral personality, although these various characteristics will determine what our concern requires us to do; for example, abortion rights for women are based on a deeper principle of liberty which men share but the latter do not require the right. So, if our concern for others does not depend on any actual equality or any inherent characteristics, what allows us to divide things in the world into those with which we are concerned and those which do not concern us? Singer's answer is not unfamiliar: one should be concerned with those beings who suffer since to be able to suffer is the precondition to having interests at all.
Singer here offers his own relationship between the requirements of reason and the constraints of the world. There is the element of idealism in the demand that However, all talk of impartiality rests upon the recognition of beings as either to be considered or not to be considered and, thus, the ontological question is prior to the ethical one. Impartiality certainly does not entail utilitarianism and does not favour it unless one already assumes the recognition of those beings with interests as the relevant ethical one. 21 This can clearly be seen in Singer's own An alternative reason why there is such resistance to rewriting the distinction between animals and humans may simply be Marxist rather than Hegelian. It is not consciousness which determines being, but being (the economic structure) which determines our ways of thinking. The food industry alone, if restructured along the lines of the new principle of equality, would demand huge economic and social restructuring. Add to this: by-products, connected industries, entertainment, differences in the needs of countries due to their environments, then the belief that, as long as we get our way of thinking in order, equality will pervade is flatly wrong. 26 With the Inuit it was necessity which justified the nonextension of the principle to animals, with us, the non-extension of the principle is not explained by the Great Chain of Being, as Singer supposes, but by the amount of money and the power of the social institutions involved in industries which can only survive if we continue to think of animals as in some way inferior to ourselves and tools for own use. To return once more to Plutarch's words, if there is no necessity, then the madness which directs human reasoning -that is, the irrationality at the heart of one's ontological distinction -is the economic system itself and not an outdated ideology. And if that is the case, and if Singer is consistent, then one needs to change the economic base of society through action. Theoretical, abstract ruminations of symptomatic ideology is immaterial and incidental.
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Between the Species, VIII, August 2008, cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ Being and consciousness are, as has been stated, in a reciprocal relationship,
Singer believes that his principle is more rational and we can agree with him.
The problem is that the actuality of the world will not fit into his rational scheme until the industries dependent on the supposed inferiority of animals are in some way made less central to our way of life. It seems that the only conclusion to be made here is a rather radical one. Singer wants to demonstrate the irrationality and arbitrariness of a prescription which determines all humans as equal whilst excluding the interests of other species. The explanation of why such a principle is still accepted he finds in the ideology of the Great Chain of Being. Yet, such an ideology would also obstruct the rights of women, non-monarchs, laymen as opposed to priests. These were swept aside in waves which began with the Reformation, continued with the Enlightenment and the civil and democratic movements of the twentieth century. Such an ideology is no longer in play but was overthrown through revolutionary action and not intellectual reflection. It seems that the ontological distinction between humans and animals is itself a symptom of deeper economic necessity: being determines consciousness and not vice versa as Singer believes. Revolutionary action aimed at institutions and practices which embody such a distinction may be the only way to make the world rational, that is make it fit with Singer's more rational prescription. This is not to endorse such action, but to say that it is the sole way for Singer's principle of equal considerations of interests to become both rational and actual. As it is, the actuality of the world resists Singer's arguments, no matter how compelling they are to the mind. 
